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in innovation and economic growth, which in turn decreases labor-market tightness and in-
creases unemployment. Under the CIA constraint on consumption, a higher ination instead
decreases unemployment in addition to stiing innovation and economic growth. Therefore,
the two CIA constraints have drastically di¤erent implications on the long-run relationship
between ination and unemployment. We also calibrate our model to aggregate data in the
US and Eurozone to explore quantitative implications on the relationship between ination
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1 Introduction
The relationship between ination, unemployment and economic growth has long been a funda-
mental question in economics. This study provides a growth-theoretic analysis on this important
relationship in a Schumpeterian model with equilibrium unemployment. Creative destruction refers
to the process through which new technologies destroy existing rms. On the one hand, the destruc-
tive part of this process leads to job losses. On the other hand, new technologies also create new
rms with new employment opportunities. In a frictionless labor market, these job destructions and
job creations could o¤set each other leaving the labor market with full employment. However, given
the presence of matching frictions between rms and workers, this continuous turnover in the labor
market as a result of creative destruction leads to what Joseph Schumpeter (1939) referred to as
"technological unemployment". At the rst glance, it may seem that technological unemployment
is a very specic kind of unemployment; however, as Schumpeter [1911] (2003, p.89) wrote, "[i]t
doubtlessly explains a good deal of the phenomenon of unemployment, in my opinion its better
half."
To explore the e¤ects of ination on unemployment and economic growth, we introduce money
demand via cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on consumption and R&D investment into a scale-
invariant Schumpeterian growth model with equilibrium unemployment. Early empirical studies
such as Hall (1992) and Opler et al. (1999) nd a positive and signicant relationship between
R&D and cash ows in US rms. Bates et al. (2009) document that the average cash-to-assets
ratio in US rms increased substantially from 1980 to 2006 and argue that this is partly driven
by their rising R&D expenditures. Brown and Petersen (2011) provide evidence that rms smooth
R&D expenditures by maintaining a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form of cash reserves. Berentsen
et al. (2012) argue that information frictions and limited collateral value of intangible R&D capital
prevent rms from nancing R&D investment through debt or equity forcing them to fund R&D
projects with cash reserves. A recent study by Falato and Sim (2014) provides causal evidence that
R&D is indeed an important determinant of rmscash holdings. They use rm-level data in the
US to show that rmscash holdings increase (decrease) signicantly in response to a rise (cut) in
R&D tax credits, which vary across states and time. Furthermore, these e¤ects are stronger for
rms that have less access to debt/equity nancing. These results suggest that due to the presence
of nancing frictions, rms need to hold cash to nance their R&D investment. We capture these
cash requirements on R&D using a CIA constraint.
Under the CIA constraint on R&D, an increase in ination that determines the opportunity
cost of cash holdings raises the cost of R&D investment. Consequently, a higher ination decreases
R&D. Given that we remove scale e¤ects1 by considering a semi-endogenous-growth version of the
Schumpeterian model in which the long-run rate of creative destruction is determined by exogenous
parameters, a decrease in R&D leads to a decrease in the growth rate of technology only in the
short run but decreases the level of technology in the long run. Although the rate of creative de-
struction decreases temporarily, the decrease in innovation in the long run decreases the number of
labor-market vacancies relative to unemployed workers causing a positive e¤ect on unemployment.
In other words, due to the decrease in labor market tightness, a higher ination increases unem-
ployment in the long run. Under the CIA constraint on consumption, a higher ination instead
decreases unemployment in addition to stiing innovation and economic growth. Therefore, the
two CIA constraints have drastically di¤erent implications on the long-run relationship between
1See Jones (1999) for a discussion of scale e¤ects in the R&D-based growth model.
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ination and unemployment. The empirical literature on ination and unemployment also pro-
vides mixed results on the relationship between ination and unemployment. For example, Ireland
(1999), Beyer and Farmer (2007), Russell and Banerjee (2008) and Berentsen et al. (2011) docu-
ment a positive relationship between ination and unemployment in the US, whereas Karanassou
et al. (2005, 2008) nd a negative relationship between the two variables in the US and European
countries. Our theoretical analysis provides a plausible and parsimonious explanation (via the rela-
tive magnitude of the two CIA constraints) on the di¤erent empirical relationships between ination
and unemployment. We calibrate our model to aggregate data in the US to explore quantitative
implications and nd that the model delivers a positive (negative) relationship between ination
and unemployment when we use data on M0 (M1) as the measure of money. Interestingly, when we
calibrate the model to data in the Eurozone, we nd that the model delivers a negative relationship
between ination and unemployment under both measures of money. We discuss intuition behind
these results in the main text.
This study relates to the literature on Schumpeterian growth; see Segerstrom et al. (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) for seminal studies. However, these
studies feature full employment rendering them unsuitable for the purpose of analyzing unemploy-
ment. Early contributions in the Schumpeterian theory of unemployment are Aghion and Howitt
(1994, 1998), Cerisier and Postel-Vinay (1998), Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), Pissarides (2000),
S¸ener (2000, 2001) and Postel-Vinay (2002).2 The present study complements these seminal studies
by introducing money demand into the Schumpeterian model with unemployment and analyzing
the e¤ects of ination on unemployment and economic growth. To our knowledge, this combination
of Schumpeterian growth, money demand and equilibrium unemployment is novel to the literature.
This study also relates to the literature on ination and economic growth. In this literature,
Stockman (1981) and Abel (1985) analyze the e¤ects of ination via a CIA constraint on capital
investment in a monetary version of the Neoclassical growth model. Subsequent studies in this
literature explore the e¤ects of ination in variants of the capital-based growth model. This study
instead relates more closely to the literature on ination and innovation-driven growth. In this
literature, the seminal study by Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) analyzes the e¤ects of ination via a
CIA constraint on consumption in a variety-expanding growth model based on Romer (1990). In
contrast, we explore the e¤ects of ination in a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model. Chu and Lai
(2013), Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Chu, Cozzi, Lai and Liao (2014) also analyze the relationship
between ination and economic growth in the Schumpeterian model. However, all these studies
exhibit full employment due to the absence of matching frictions in the labor market. The present
study provides a novel contribution to the literature by introducing equilibrium unemployment
driven by matching frictions to the monetary Schumpeterian growth model. A recent study by
Wang and Xie (2013) also analyzes the e¤ects of ination on economic growth and unemployment
driven by matching frictions in the labor market. Their model generates money demand via CIA
constraints on consumption and wage payment to production workers. In contrast, we model money
demand via a CIA constraint on R&D. More importantly, they consider capital accumulation as the
engine of economic growth whereas our analysis complements their interesting study by exploring
a di¤erent growth engine that is R&D and innovation.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Schumpeterian model.
Section 3 provides a qualitative analysis on the e¤ects of ination on unemployment and economic
growth. Section 4 presents our quantitative results. The nal section concludes.
2See also Parello (2010) who considers a Schumpeterian model with unemployment by e¢ ciency wage.
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2 A monetary Schumpeterian model with unemployment
In the Schumpeterian model, economic growth is driven by quality improvement. R&D entrepre-
neurs invent higher-quality products in order to dominate the market and earn monopolistic prots.
When R&D entrepreneurs create new inventions, they open up vacancies to recruit workers from
the labor market, in which the number of job separations is determined by creative destruction
and the number of job matches is determined by an aggregate matching function and labor market
tightness. Due to matching frictions between workers and rms with new technologies, the economy
features equilibrium unemployment in the long run. Unlike the important precedent of Mortensen
(2005), we (a) allow for population growth and remove the scale e¤ect via increasing R&D di¢ culty
as in Segerstrom (1998), (b) introduce money demand via CIA constraints on consumption and
R&D investment as in Chu and Cozzi (2014), and (c) consider elastic labor supply.
2.1 Household
The representative household has Lt members, which increase at an exogenous rate g > 0. The
households lifetime utility function is given by
U =
Z 1
0
e t [ln ct +  ln(Lt   lt)] dt, (1)
where ct denotes the households total consumption of nal goods (numeraire) at time t. Each
member of the household supplies one unit of labor, and lt is the households total supply of labor
at time t. The parameter  > 0 determines subjective discounting, and   0 determines leisure
preference.
The asset-accumulation equation expressed in real terms is given by
_at + _mt = rtat   tmt + itdt + It    t   ct. (2)
at is the real value of nancial assets (in the form of equity shares in monopolistic intermediate
goods rms) owned by the household. rt is the real interest rate. t is the ination rate. mt is
the real money balance accumulated by the household. dt is the amount of money lent to R&D
entrepreneurs subject to the following constraint: dt + ct  mt, where  2 [0; 1] parameterizes the
strength of the CIA constraint on consumption. The interest rate on money lending dt to R&D rms
is the nominal interest rate,3 which is equal to it = rt+t from the Fisher identity.  t is a lump-sum
tax levied on the household. It is the total amount of labor income given by It  wtxt+!tRt+btut,4
where wt is the wage rate of production workers xt, !t is the wage rate of R&D workers Rt, and bt is
unemployment benets provided to unemployed workers ut who are searching for jobs in the labor
market. To ensure balanced growth, we assume that bt = byt=Lt is proportional to total output
per capita, where b 2 (0; 1) is an unemployment-benet parameter. Given the labor force lt, the
resource constraint on labor at time t is
xt +Rt + ut = lt. (3)
3It can be easily shown as a no-arbitrage condition that the interest rate on dt must be equal to it.
4The household pools the di¤erent sources of labor income for sharing among all members.
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The household chooses consumption ct and labor supply lt and accumulates assets at and money
mt to maximize (1) subject to (2), (3) and the CIA constraint dt+ct  mt. The resulting optimality
condition for labor supply is
lt = Lt   (1 + it)ct
!t
, (4)
where the opportunity cost of leisure is the R&D wage rate !t because individuals can freely choose
between employment in the R&D sector and job search.5 The intertemporal optimality condition
is given by
 
_t
t
= rt   , (5)
where t is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2) and determined by t = [(1 + it)ct]
 1. In the
case of a constant nominal interest rate i, (5) becomes the familiar Euler equation _ct=ct = rt   .
2.2 Final goods
Final goods yt are produced by perfectly competitive rms that aggregate a unit continuum of
intermediate goods using the following Cobb-Douglas aggregator:
yt = exp
Z 1
0
ln [At(j)xt(j)] dj

, (6)
where At(j)  qnt(j) is the productivity or quality level of intermediate good xt(j).6 The parameter
q > 1 is the exogenous step size of each quality improvement, and nt(j) is the number of innovations
that have been invented and implemented in industry j as of time t. From prot maximization, the
conditional demand function for xt(j) is
xt(j) = yt=pt(j), (7)
where pt(j) is the price of xt(j) for j 2 [0; 1]. All prices are denominated in units of nal goods,
chosen as the numeraire.
2.3 Intermediate goods
The unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods are produced in a unit continuum of in-
dustries. Each industry is temporarily dominated by a quality leader until the arrival and imple-
mentation of the next higher-quality product. The owner of the new innovation becomes the next
quality leader.7 The current quality leader in industry j uses one unit of labor to produce one unit
of intermediate good xt(j). We assume - as in Mortensen (2005) - that the employer has no outside
5Given that R&D is essentially the search for a higher-quality product, there is no need to have it preceded by
another search activity.
6Given we will assume that one unit of labor produces one unit of intermediate goods, we use xt to denote both
the quantity of intermediate goods and the quantity of production workers, for notational convenience.
7This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect; see Cozzi (2007a) for a discussion of the Arrow e¤ect.
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option and the workersoutside option is unemployment benet bt. In this case, the generalized
Nash bargaining game is8
fxt(j); wt(j)g = arg maxf[wt(j)  bt]xt(j)gf[pt(j)  wt(j)]xt(j)g1 , (8)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) measures the bargaining power of workers. The bargaining outcome
on wage is9
wt(j) = pt(j) + (1  )bt, (9)
which is an average between the marginal revenue product pt(j) of each worker and the value of
unemployment benet bt weighted by the bargaining power of workers. The employer and workers
commit to this wage schedule over the lifetime of the rm. Substituting (9) into (8) shows that the
xt(j) that maximizes (8) is the same as the xt(j) that maximizes the following prot function:
t(j) = [pt(j)  wt(j)]xt(j) = (1  )[pt(j)  bt]xt(j) = (1  )[yt   btxt(j)], (10)
where the second equality uses (9) and the third equality uses (7).
In the original model in Grossman and Helpman (1991), the markup is assumed to be given
by the quality step size q, due to limit pricing between the current and previous quality leaders.
Here we follow Howitt (1999) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to consider a more realistic
scenario in which new quality leaders do not engage in limit pricing with previous quality leaders
because after the implementation of the newest innovations, previous quality leaders exit the market
and need to search for workers before reentering. Given the Cobb-Douglas aggregator in (6), the
unconstrained monopolistic price would be innity (i.e., xt(j)! 0). We follow Evans et al. (2003)
to consider price regulation under which the regulated markup ratio cannot be greater than z > 1.10
The equilibrium price is
pt(j) = zwt(j) = z
1  
1  z bt, (11)
where the second equality uses (9). We impose an additional parameter restriction given by z < 1.
Substituting (11) into (7) yields
xt(j) = xt =
1  z
(1  )z
yt
bt
=
1  z
(1  )zbLt, (12)
where the last equality uses bt = byt=Lt. Finally, the amount of monopolistic prot is
t(j) = t = (pt   wt)xt = z   1
z
yt. (13)
Given that the amount of monopolistic prot is the same across industries, we will follow the
standard treatment in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium, in which the arrival
rate of innovations is equal across industries.11
8Using a more general bargaining condition with the value functions of employment and unemployment would
complicate the model without providing new insight; see for example footnote 3 in Mortensen (2005).
9This bargaining outcome can also be obtained from wt(j) = arg maxf[wt(j)   bt] [pt(j)   wt(j)]1 g (i.e.,
individual wage bargaining).
10This formulation enables us to separate the markup and the quality step size, allowing for a more realistic
calibration exercise.
11See Cozzi (2007b) for a discussion of multiple equilibria in the Schumpeterian model. Cozzi et al. (2007) provide
a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation equilibrium in the
Schumpeterian model.
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2.4 R&D
R&D is performed by a continuum of competitive entrepreneurs. If an R&D entrepreneur sinks eRt
units of labor to engage in innovation in an industry, then she is successful in inventing the next
higher-quality product in the industry with an instantaneous probability given by
et = h eRt
At
, (14)
where h > 0 is an innovation-productivity parameter that captures the abilities of R&D entre-
preneurs. We assume that innovation productivity h=At decreases in aggregate quality At 
exp
R 1
0
lnAt(j)dj

in order to capture increasing di¢ culty of R&D in the economy,12 and this
specication removes the scale e¤ects in the innovation process of the quality-ladder model as in
Segerstrom (1998).13 The expected benet from investing in R&D is Vtetdt, where Vt is the value
of the expected discounted prots generated by a new innovation and etdt is the entrepreneurs
probability of having a successful innovation during the innitesimal time interval dt. To facilitate
the payment R&D wages, the entrepreneur borrows money from the household, and the cost of
borrowing is determined by the nominal interest rate it. To parameterize the strength of this CIA
constraint on R&D, we assume that a fraction  2 [0; 1] of R&D expenditure requires the borrowing
of money from households. Therefore, the total cost of R&D is (1 + it)!t eRtdt. Free entry implies
Vtetdt = (1 + it)!t eRtdt, Vt = (1 + it)!tAt=h, (15)
where the second equality uses (14).
2.5 Matching and unemployment
When an R&D entrepreneur has a new innovation, she is not able to immediately launch the
new product to the market due to matching frictions in the initial recruitment of manufacturing
workers.14 Instead, she has to open up xt vacancies to recruit xt workers for producing and launching
her products to the market. We follow the standard treatment in the search-and-matching literature
to consider an aggregate matching function F (vt; ut), where vt is the number of vacancies in the
labor market and ut is the number of unemployed workers. F (vt; ut) has the usual properties of
being increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree one in vt and ut. In the economy, the number
of successful matches at time t is given by F (vt; ut); in other words, the number of workers who
nd jobs is F (vt; ut). Therefore, the job-nding rate is
t = F (vt; ut)=ut = F (vt=ut; 1) M(t), (16)
12See Venturini (2012) for empirical evidence based on US manufacturing data that supports the semi-endogenous
growth model with increasing di¢ culty of R&D.
13Segerstrom (1998) considers an industry-specic index of R&D di¢ culty. Here we consider an aggregate index
of R&D di¢ culty to simplify notation without altering the aggregate results of our analysis.
14Dinopoulos et al. (2013) consider an interesting setting, aimed at studying the importance of rent-seeking
activities on unemployment, in which new rms are able to immediately recruit a fraction  2 (0; 1) of the desired
number of workers xt.
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where t  vt=ut denotes labor market tightness, and t = M(t) is increasing in t. Similarly, the
number of vacancies lled is also F (vt; ut), so the vacancy-lling rate is
t = F (vt; ut)=vt = M(t)=t, (17)
where t = M(t)=t is decreasing in t. Following the usual treatment in the literature,
15 we assume
that when matching occurs to a rm at time t, the rm matches with xt workers simultaneously.
In other words, the number of successful matches at time t is rst determined by the matching
function F (vt; ut), and then, these matches are randomly assigned to F (vt; ut)=xt rms. Therefore,
the probability for a rm with opened vacancies to match with xt workers at time t is also t. After
an entrepreneur sets up her rm by having successful matches with xt workers at time t, we assume
for tractability that she can instantly recruit additional workers at the same wage schedule in (9)
as demand xt increases overtime.16
2.6 Asset values
Each unemployed worker faces the probability t of being employed at any point in time. Once
a worker is hired by a rm, he/she begins employment and faces the probability et of the next
innovation being invented in his/her industry. After the innovation is invented, the worker faces
the probability t of the next innovation being implemented and his/her rm being forced out of
the market due to creative destruction. Let Ut denote the value of being unemployed. The familiar
asset-pricing equation of Ut is
rt =
bt + _Ut + t(Wt   Ut)
Ut
, (18)
where t is the rate at which an unemployed worker becomes employed and Wt denotes the value
of being employed in an industry in which the subsequent innovation has not been invented. The
asset-pricing equation of Wt is
rt =
wt + _Wt + et(St  Wt)
Wt
, (19a)
where et is the rate at which the subsequent innovation is invented and St denotes the value of
being employed in an industry in which the subsequent innovation has been invented but not yet
been launched to the market.17 The asset-pricing equation of St is
rt =
wt + _St + t(Ut   St)
St
, (19b)
where t is the rate at which the subsequent innovation is launched to the market and the worker
becomes unemployed. Given that a worker must be indi¤erent between being employed by an R&D
15See for example Mortensen (2005) and Dinopoulos et al. (2013).
16In other words, existing rms can hire additional workers without searching, but these additional workers are
not necessarily newborn workers. It only happens to be the case that xt grows at the same rate as Lt, as shown in
(12). Here we assume g is su¢ ciently small such that it has negligible e¤ects on the labor market.
17Unlike Mortensen (2005) who exogenously assumes that the current quality leader stops its operation as soon as
the next innovation is invented, we allow the current quality leader to continue its operation until the next innovation
is implemented. This generalization is rational for the current quality leader, who continues to earn prots, and also
for the workers because St > Ut.
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entrepreneur and engaging in job search, the wage of R&D workers is equal to
!t = rtUt   _Ut. (20)
The life cycle of an innovation can be described as follows. When an innovation is invented, its
owner creates vacancies in the labor market to recruit workers, and the probability of successfully
recruiting workers and beginning production at any point in time is t. Once an innovation is
launched to the market, it faces the probability et of the next innovation being invented. The
subsequent innovation cannot be invented until the current innovation has been launched to the
market and directly observed.18 After the next innovation is invented, the probability of it being
launched to the market is t. Once the next innovation is launched to the market, the value of the
current innovation becomes zero. Let Vt be the value of a new innovation for which its vacancies
have not been lled. Its asset-pricing equation is given by
rt =
_Vt + t (Zt   Vt)
Vt
, (21a)
where t is the rate at which the product is launched to the market. The asset-pricing equation of
Zt, which is the value of the innovation when its vacancies have been lled, is given by
rt =
t + _Zt + et (Xt   Zt)
Zt
, (21b)
where et is the rate at which the subsequent innovation is invented. The asset-pricing equation of
Xt, which is the value of the current innovation when the subsequent innovation has been invented
but not yet been launched to the market, is given by
rt =
t + _Xt   tXt
Xt
, (21c)
where t is the rate at which the subsequent innovation is launched to the market.
2.7 Government
The monetary policy instrument that we consider is the ination rate t, which is exogenously set by
the monetary authority. Given t, the nominal interest rate is endogenously determined according
to the Fisher identity such that it = t + rt, where rt is the real interest rate. The growth rate of
the nominal money supply is t = t + _mt=mt.
19 Finally, the government balances the scal budget
subject to the following balanced-budget condition:  t = btut   tmt.
18This assumption, shared by Mortensen (2005), captures the realistic feature of the intertemporal spillovers,
of equally beneting from patent description and actual use of the good. This aspect is often remarked in the
microeconomic literature on innovation.
19It is useful to note that in this model, it is the growth rate of the money supply that a¤ects the real economy in
the long run, and a one-time change in the level of money supply has no long-run e¤ect on the real economy. This is
the well-known distinction between the neutrality and superneutrality of money. Empirical evidence generally favors
neutrality and rejects superneutrality, consistent with our model; see Fisher and Seater (1993) for a discussion on
the neutrality and superneutrality of money.
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2.8 Steady-state equilibrium
We will dene the aggregate innovation-arrival rate as t = (1   ft)et, where ft is the measure of
industries with unlaunched innovations. The outow from the pool of rms searching for workers
is given by tft, and the inow into this pool is given by t. Therefore, in the steady state, we must
have tft = t. The aggregate production function of nal goods is given by yt = Atxt, where (the
log of) aggregate technology At is dened as
lnAt 
Z 1
0
lnAt(j)dj =
Z 1
0
nt(j)dj ln q =
Z t
0
fd ln q, (22)
where we have normalized A0 = 1 (i.e., lnA0 = 0). Di¤erentiating (22) with respect to t yields
_At=At = tft ln q, where tft is the measure of industries with newly launched innovations at time
t. The steady-state growth rate of At is
_At
At
= f ln q =  ln q = g, (23)
where the third equality holds because  = hRt=At must be constant on the balanced growth path
implying that Rt and At must both grow at the exogenous rate g in the long run.20 From the last
equality of (23), the steady-state rate of creative destruction is determined by exogenous parameters
such that  = g= ln q.
On the balanced growth path, (20) becomes
!t = (+ g)Ut. (24)
Solving (18) and (19) yields the balanced-growth value of (+ g)Ut given by
(+ g)Ut = (+ g)
(+ g + ) (+ g + e)bt + (+ g +  + e)wt
(+ g + ) (+ g + e) (+ g + )  e , (25)
where e = =(1  f) = =(1  =). From (21), the balanced-growth value of Vt is
Vt =
(t + eXt)
(+ )(+ e) = +  + e(+ )2(+ e)t. (26)
Substituting (24)-(26) into (15) yields
+  + e
(+ )2(+ e)t = Ath (1 + i) (+ g)(+ g + ) (+ g + e)bt + (+ g +  + e)wt(+ g + ) (+ g + e) (+ g + )  e . (27)
For convenience, we dene a transformed variable t  At=Lt, which is the per capita level of
aggregate technology. Substituting (11), (13) and bt = byt=Lt into (27) and then rearranging terms
20The semi-endogenous growth model does not require the growth rate of technology to be equal to the population
growth rate. If we consider a more general specication  = hRt=A

t , then _At=At = g= in the long run. We consider
a special case  = 1 for simplicity. Furthermore, it is useful to note that it is the growth rate of R&D labor Rt that
determines the growth rate of technology. However, in the long run, the growth rate of R&D labor coincides with
the population growth rate to ensure a balanced growth path.
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yield
 =
z   1
(1 + i) zb
h
(+ g)(+ e) (+ g + ) (+ g + e) (+ g + )  e(+ g + ) (+ g + e) + (+ g +  + e)(1  )=(1  z)(),
(28)
where e = =(1  =),  = M(),  = M()= and
()  
+ 
 
1 +
e
+ 
!
.
We refer to (28) as the R&D free-entry (FE) condition, which contains two endogenous variables
f; g.21 It is useful to note that the FE condition depends on the nominal interest rate i via
the CIA constraint on R&D (i.e.,  > 0). From the R&D free-entry condition in (15), we have
L = h[(1 + i) (+ g)] 1V=U , where we have also used (24). Whenever an increase in labor market
tightness  reduces the vacancy-lling rate  and increases the job-nding rate , it decreases the
value V of an invention relative to the value U of unemployment, which in turn requires  to fall
in the long run in order for the R&D free-entry condition to hold. We summarize this result in
Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The FE curve describes a negative relationship between  and  if  is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To close the model, we use the following steady-state condition that equates the inow  into
the pool of rms searching for workers to its outow f :
 = f = v=x = M()u=x, (29)
where the second equality follows from fx = v, where f is the number of rms with opened vacancies
and x is the number of vacancies per rm. The third equality in (29) follows from (17) and uses the
denition of   v=u. Furthermore, we need to derive the equilibrium supply of labor l. Substituting
(11), (24), (25), bt = byt=Lt and ct = yt into (4) yields
l( i
 
; 
+
)=L = 1  (1 + i)
(+ g)b
(+ g + ) (+ g + e) (+ g + )  e
(+ g + ) (+ g + e) + (+ g +  + e)(1  )=(1  z) , (30)
which is increasing in  if  is su¢ ciently large as we will show in the proof of Lemma 2. Substituting
(3), (12), (14) and (30) into (29) and applying the denition of   A=L yield
 =
h


l( i
 
; 
+
)=L 

1 +

M()

1  z
(1  )zb

. (31)
We refer to (31) as the labor-market (LM) condition, which also contains two endogenous variables
f; g. It is useful to note that the LM condition depends on the nominal interest rate i via the
CIA constraint on consumption (i.e.,  > 0). From (14), we have  = h

R=L. An increase in
21Recall that  = g= ln q is determined by exogenous parameters in the steady state.
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labor-market tightness  reduces unemployment u, which in turn increases the supply of labor for
R&D R. As a result of increased R&D, innovation becomes more di¢ cult (i.e.,  increases) in the
long run, and this e¤ect is present regardless of whether labor supply is elastic or inelastic. We
summarize this result in Lemma 2. Finally, (28) and (31) can be used to solve for the steady-state
equilibrium values of f; g; see Figure 1 for an illustration.
Lemma 2 The LM curve describes a positive relationship between  and  if  is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 1: Steady-state equilibrium
3 Ination, unemployment and economic growth
In this section, we explore the relationship between ination, unemployment and economic growth.
Section 3.1 considers the e¤ects of ination via the CIA constraint on R&D (i.e.,  > 0 and  = 0).
Section 3.2 considers the e¤ects of ination via the CIA constraint on consumption (i.e.,  = 0 and
 > 0).
3.1 Ination via the CIA constraint on R&D
In this subsection, we explore the e¤ects of ination on unemployment and economic growth under
the CIA constraint on R&D. From the Fisher identity, we have i =  + r =  +  + 2g, where the
second equality uses the Euler equation and _ct=ct = _At=At + g = 2g. Therefore, a one-unit increase
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in the ination rate leads to a one-unit increase in the nominal interest rate in the long run.22 In
Figure 1, we see that an increase in the nominal interest rate i (caused by an increase in ination
) shifts the FE curve to the left reducing labor market tightness  and the per capita level of
technology . As for the resulting e¤ect on unemployment u, we see from (29) that unemployment
u = x=M() (where  and x are determined by exogenous parameters and independent of i) is
decreasing in the job-nding rate M(). Therefore, the increase in ination  raises unemployment
u by reducing labor market tightness  and the job-nding rate M(). From (14), aggregate R&D
is given by R = L=h; therefore, the higher ination  (that decreases the level of technology )
also reduces R&D. Now we consider the e¤ect of ination on economic growth. The dynamics of per
capita technology t  At=Lt is given by _t=t = _At=At g. Therefore, given that a higher ination
 decreases the steady-state value of , it must also decrease the growth rate of At temporarily
such that _At=At < g before t reaches the new steady state. We summarize all these results in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Under the CIA constraint on R&D, a higher ination has (a) a positive e¤ect on
unemployment, (b) a negative e¤ect on R&D, (c) a negative e¤ect on the growth rate of technology
in the short run, and (d) a negative e¤ect on the level of technology in the long run.
Proof. Proven in text.
The intuition of Proposition 1 can be explained as follows. A higher ination leads to an increase
in the opportunity cost of cash holdings, which in turn increases the cost of R&D investment via the
CIA constraint on R&D. As a result, R&D decreases resulting into a lower growth rate of technology
in the short run and a lower level of technology in the long run. The negative relationship between
ination and R&D is consistent with the empirical evidence based on cross-sectional regressions
in Chu and Lai (2013) and panel regressions in Chu, Cozzi, Lai and Liao (2014). The negative
relationship between ination and economic growth is also supported by the cross-country evidence
in Fischer (1993), Guerrero (2006), Vaona (2012) and Chu, Kan, Lai and Liao (2014). Although
the rate of creative destruction decreases temporarily, the decrease in innovation in the long run
reduces labor-market vacancies relative to unemployed workers. Consequently, this reduction in
labor-market tightness increases long-run unemployment. Therefore, under the CIA constraint on
R&D, ination and unemployment have a positive relationship in the long run, and this theoretical
result is consistent with empirical studies, such as Ireland (1999), Beyer and Farmer (2007), Russell
and Banerjee (2008) and Berentsen et al. (2011) who consider data in the US.
Finally, it is easy to see from the FE condition in (28) and Proposition 1 that relaxing the
liquidity constraint on R&D (i.e., a decrease in ) would reduce unemployment and increase R&D
and innovation.
3.2 Ination via the CIA constraint on consumption
In this subsection, we explore the e¤ects of ination on unemployment and economic growth under
the CIA constraint on consumption. In this case, Figure 1 shows that an increase in ination  shifts
22For example, Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001) provide empirical evidence for a positive relationship
between ination and the nominal interest rate in the long run.
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the LM curve to the right increasing labor market tightness  and decreasing the level of technology
. As for the resulting e¤ect on unemployment u, we see from (29) that unemployment u = x=M()
is decreasing in the job-nding rateM(). Therefore, the increase in ination  surprisingly reduces
unemployment u. From (14), aggregate R&D is given by R = L=h; therefore, the higher ination
 also reduces R&D. As for the e¤ect of ination on economic growth, given that ination 
decreases the steady-state value of , it must decrease the growth rate of At temporarily before t
reaches the new steady state. We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Under the CIA constraint on consumption, a higher ination has (a) a negative
e¤ect on unemployment, (b) a negative e¤ect on R&D, (c) a negative e¤ect on the growth rate of
technology in the short run, and (d) a negative e¤ect on the level of technology in the long run.
Proof. Proven in text.
The intuition behind the negative relationship between ination and unemployment can be
explained as follows. A higher ination leads to an increase in the opportunity cost of cash holdings,
which in turn increases the cost of consumption relative to leisure. As a result, the household
consumes more leisure and reduces labor supply. The decrease in labor supply reduces the number
of workers searching for employment. The resulting increase in labor-market tightness decreases
unemployment. Therefore, under the CIA constraint on consumption, ination and unemployment
have a negative relationship in the long run, and this theoretical result is consistent with empirical
studies, such as Karanassou et al. (2005, 2008) who consider data in the US and Europe. Finally,
it is easy to see from (30) and Proposition 2 that relaxing the liquidity constraint on consumption
(i.e., a decrease in ) would increase unemployment, R&D and innovation.
4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we rst calibrate the model to aggregate data in the US to explore quantitative
implications. To facilitate this quantitative analysis, we follow the standard approach in the lit-
erature to specify a Cobb-Douglas matching function F (vt; ut) = 'v"tu
1 "
t , where the parameter
' > 0 captures matching e¢ ciency and the parameter " 2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of matches with
respect to vacancies. Under this matching function, the job-nding rate becomes t = '
"
t , and the
vacancy-lling rate becomes t = '
" 1
t .
In summary, the model features the following structural parameters f; g; ; b; z; q; ; ; ; "; 'g
and a policy variable t. We follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to set the discount rate  to
0.05. We consider a long-run technology growth rate g of 1%. We follow Berentsen et al. (2011)
to set " = 1    = 0:28, so that the elasticity of matches with respect to vacancies is equal to
the bargaining power of rms satisfying the Hosios (1990) rule. We calibrate b to match data on
unemployment benets as a ratio of per capita income, which is about one quarter in the US. As
for the ination rate , we consider a long-run value of 3%. Then, we calibrate the remaining
parameters fz; q; ; '; ; g by targeting theoretical moments to empirical data. We calibrate the
markup ratio z to match data on R&D as a share of GDP, which is about 3% in the US. We calibrate
the quality step size q, which determines the rate of creative destruction  = g= ln q, in order to
match a long-run unemployment rate u=l of 6%. We calibrate the leisure parameter  to match the
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ratio of labor force to the working-age population (aged 16 to 64), which is about three quarters in
the US. We calibrate matching e¢ ciency ' to match a long-run average job-nding rate  of 0.3, as
estimated in Hall (2005). We calibrate the CIA-R&D parameter  to match the semi-elasticity of
R&D/GDP with respect to ination @ ln(R&D=GDP )=@ = 0:4 estimated in Chu, Cozzi, Lai and
Liao (2014). Finally, we calibrate the CIA-consumption parameter  to match the money-output
ratio m=y. We consider two conventional measures of money: M0 and M1. In the US, the average
M0-output ratio is about 0.06, whereas the average M1-output ratio is about 0.12. The calibrated
parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values for the US
 g b  " ' z q   
M0 0.05 0.01 0.25 0.72 0.28 0.17 1.30 1.65 0.24 0.05 0.43
M1 0.05 0.01 0.25 0.72 0.28 0.16 1.30 1.65 0.24 0.12 0.07
Given the above parameter values, we proceed to simulate the long-run Phillips curve (with
ination on the horizontal axis) in this calibrated US economy. Figure 2a shows an upward-sloping
Phillips curve under the M0 specication, whereas Figure 2b shows a downward-sloping Phillips
curve under the M1 specication. The intuition behind these contrasting results can be explained as
follows. Under the M0 specication, the relatively low money-output ratio implies a small degree of
CIA on consumption (i.e., a small ). As a result, in order to match the empirical semi-elasticity of
R&D with respect to ination, the degree of CIA on R&D must be relatively large (i.e., a large ).
In this case, the e¤ect of ination on unemployment works through mainly the R&D channel giving
rise to a positive relationship between the two variables. Under the M1 specication, the relatively
high money-output ratio implies a larger degree of CIA on consumption (i.e., a larger ), which in
turn is almost su¢ cient to deliver the empirical semi-elasticity of R&D with respect to ination.
As a result, the implied degree of CIA on R&D becomes much smaller (i.e., a much smaller ). In
this case, the e¤ect of ination on unemployment works through mainly the consumption-leisure
tradeo¤giving rise to a negative relationship between the two variables. This ambiguous relationship
between ination and unemployment in the US is consistent with the contrasting empirical results
in the literature.
Figure 2a Figure 2b
In the rest of this section, we recalibrate the model to the Eurozone, which features lower R&D,
higher unemployment, lower job-nding rate, higher unemployment benets and higher money-
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output ratio than the US. Specically, we consider an R&D-output ratio of 2%, a long-run unem-
ployment rate of 9%, an average job-nding rate  of 0.07,23 and unemployment benets as a ratio
of per capita income of 0.4.24 Finally, we consider the two measures of money as before: an average
M0-output ratio of 0.08, and an average M1-output ratio of 0.4. Table 2 summarizes the calibrated
parameter values.
Table 2: Calibrated parameter values for the Eurozone
 g b  " ' z q   
M0 0.05 0.01 0.40 0.72 0.28 0.09 1.26 4.03 0.20 0.07 0.39
M1 0.05 0.01 0.40 0.72 0.28 0.09 1.26 4.03 0.20 0.40 0.04
Given the above parameter values, we proceed to simulate the long-run Phillips curve in this
calibrated European economy. Figures 3a shows a downward-sloping Phillips curve under the M0
specication, whereas Figure 3b also shows a downward-sloping Phillips curve under the M1 speci-
cation. The reason why the Phillips curve is always downward sloping in this case is the stronger
CIA friction on consumption, which in turn is implied by the higher money-output ratio in the
Eurozone. Under the M0 specication, the calibrated value for the CIA-consumption parameter
 is 0.07, compared to  = 0:05 in the US. The stronger CIA friction on consumption in Europe
implies that the e¤ect of ination on unemployment works through the consumption-leisure trade-
o¤ giving rise to a negative relationship between ination and unemployment even under the M0
specication. This nding of a downward-sloping Phillips curve in Europe is consistent with the
empirical evidence in Karanassou et al. (2005, 2008).
Figure 3a Figure 3b
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored a fundamental question in economics that is the long-run relation-
ship between ination, unemployment and economic growth. We consider a standard Schumpeterian
23See Hobijn and Sahin (2009) for estimates of the job-nding rates in a number of European countries.
24See Esser et al. (2013) for data on unemployment benets in European countries.
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growth model with the additions of money demand via CIA constraints and equilibrium unemploy-
ment driven by matching frictions in the labor market. In this monetary growth-theoretic framework
with search frictions, we discover a positive (negative) relationship between ination and unemploy-
ment under the CIA constraint on R&D (consumption), a negative relationship between ination
and R&D, and a negative relationship between ination and economic growth. These theoretical
predictions are largely consistent with empirical evidence.
An important policy implication from our analysis is that monetary expansion could be useful
to reduce the rather high unemployment rate in the Eurozone, but that it would come at the
expense of innovation and long-run technological competitiveness. A better policy prescription for
the European banking authorities would be to manage to ease the liquidity problems that plague
R&D activities. According to our results, this policy, unlike monetary expansion, would at the same
time decrease unemployment and increase growth and technological competitiveness.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we restrict the range of values for  to ensure that (a)  = M() <
1 (i.e., the number of workers who nd jobs at a given point in time must be less than the number
of workers searching for jobs at that time), (b)  = M()= < 1 (i.e., the number of vacancies lled
at a given point in time must be less than the number of vacancies on the market at that time),
and (c)  >  so that f = = < 1 (i.e., the number of industries with unlaunched innovations must
be less than the total number of industries, which is normalized to unity). Then, we examine each
term on the right-hand side of (28) separately. The rst term in (28) is independent of , whereas
the second term in (28) is decreasing in  given that ~ increases with . The third term in (28) can
be reexpressed as
#()  (+ g) + g +
e + (1 + e
+g+
)
+ g + e + (1 + e
+g+
)(1  )=(1  z)
. (A1)
Given (1  )=(1  z) > 1, we can show that #0() < 0 holds if25
f[1  =M()]2(+ g)= + 1g= > 1=M 0(), (A2)
which holds if  is su¢ ciently large because 1  =M() = 1  = > 0. As for the fourth term in
(28), noting  = M()= and ~ = =[1   =M()], we can show that 0() < 0 holds if and only
if26



[1  =M()]2 + 2 [1  =M()] =M()
=M() + 1

| {z }
()
> 1. (A3)
Note that () > 0 because  > 0 and 1  =M() = 1  = > 0. Therefore, we can conclude this
proof by saying that a large value of  is a su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for the FE curve
in (28) to be downward sloping in .
Proof of Lemma 2. By (30) and (A1), l(i; )=L = 1  #()(1 + i)=((+ g)b). From the proof
of Lemma 1, #() is decreasing in  if  is su¢ ciently large. Together with (31), one can easily show
that the LM curve is upward sloping in .
25Note that #0() < 0 holds if and only if
(+ g + e)" 1 + e
+ g + 
!#0
> e0 1 + e
+ g + 
!
,
which can be expressed as
(+ g + e)"e0 (+ g + )  0e
(+ g + )
2
#
> [e0  (+ g + e)0] 1 + e
+ g + 
!
.
Given 0 > 0; 0 < 0; and ~
0
> 0; this holds if ~
0
   ( + g + ~)0 < 0; which is equivalent to (A2) by  = M();
~ = = [1  =M()] ; and ~0 = ~2 [M()  M 0()] =M()2: Note that M() > M 0() by the properties of M().
26Note that
0() =
{0()
[1  {()]2 [{() + 1]2

   

[1  {()]2 + 2{() [1  {()]
{() + 1

,
where {()  =M() and thus {0() > 0.
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